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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS AND OLD ] 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE, ] 
Defendants/Appellants, ] 
vs. 
RONNY L. JUDD, 
Applicant/Appellee, ] 
and 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE ] 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ] 
Appellee. ] 
i Appellate Court No. 
i Case No.: 92-1401 
i Priority 7 
940208-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1990), 35-1-
82.53(2) (1988), 35-1-86 (1988), and63-46b-14 (1988). 
I STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL || 
Did the Industrial Commission correctly award Ronny Judd 
benefits after he was severely beaten by two young men who were 
trying to vandalize the cargo on Mr. Judd's truck? 
Did the Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in 
granting a 30-day extension to Mr. Judd for filing his Motion for 
1 
Review when defendants were not substantially prejudiced by the 
extension and the Industrial Commission did not act contrary to 
prior practice? 
I CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES \\ 
The statutes and rules that are dispositive of this 
appeal are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-3 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61 
These are attached as Addendum A, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
24(f). 
[ STATEMENT OF THE CASE || 
Mr. Judd was transporting vehicles from Missouri to 
California when he stopped for an overnight rest in Kearney, 
Nebraska. (R. 101-2). Sometime after his arrival in Kearney, Mr. 
Judd and another driver, Mr. Coyle, observed two young men 
attempting to vandalize the new cars they were transporting. (R. 
109, 149-50, 295, 469). Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle attempted to 
protect the cargo, and the young men severely beat Mr. Judd. (R. 
217, 295). 
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Mr. Judd applied for benefits and his employer denied the 
claim. Mr. Judd then filed an Application for Hearing. (R. 5-6) . 
After a hearing was held, the ALJ denied benefits because, in his 
opinion, Mr. Judd was fighting over the affections of two women and 
not protecting the vehicles he was transporting. (R. 19-28). 
Before the 30-day limit ran on filing a Motion for Review, Mr. Judd 
filed a letter with the Industrial Commission requesting a 3 0-day 
extension. (R. 29) . The Industrial Commission granted the 30-day 
extension. (R. 30). Defendants objected to the extension; 
however, in defendants' objection they failed to show how they were 
prejudiced by the extension. (R. 31-33). 
The Industrial Commission granted the Motion for Review. 
(R. 34-38). In its Order the Industrial Commission found that Mr. 
Judd's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. 
(R. 34-38). Defendants appeal the Industrial Commission's Order. 
(R. 56-57). 
[STATEMENT OF FACTS j 
Mr. Judd has been employed as a truck driver by 
Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the company's 
Clearfield, Utah, terminal. (R. 96, 97). During mid-May, 1992, 
Mr. Judd and another driver, Mr. Coyle, were assigned to drive two 
trucks loaded with new automobiles from Missouri to California. 
(R. 101) . The drivers were responsible for the safekeeping of the 
vehicles they were transporting. (R. 113, 160). 
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Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21. 
Because they were limited by company policy and/or government 
regulations to driving no more than 10 hours or 540 miles at a 
stretch, they stopped at Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night. (R. 
102). At approximately 6:30 p.m., Messrs. Judd and Coyle located 
an appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked their trucks adjacent 
to each other in the parking lot, checked into their respective 
rooms, then went to the motel's lounge. (R. 105, 106, 291, 292). 
In the lounge, Judd and Coyle consumed alcoholic 
beverages. Two women already in the bar, one of whom was a slight 
acquaintance of Judd, joined them at their table. To some degree, 
the women joined Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two 
other younger men, who had been asking the women to dance. (R. 
107, 147, 453). When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the 
two women to their car and said goodbye. The women then drove 
away. (R. 147-8, 294-5, 456). 
At approximately the same time, the two young men who had 
also been in the lounge, struck up a conversation with Judd and 
Coyle. The young men suggested that they buy more beer and drink 
it in their motel room. Judd and Coyle declined the offer, stating 
that it was too late and that they had to leave early the next 
morning. (R. 108, 148, 295, 468). During the course of this 
conversation, the young men expressed interest in the new cars 
Coyle and Judd were transporting. The young men suggested they 
would like to take one of the cars for a drive. Judd told the 
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young men that such use of the cars was not permitted, and that the 
cars all had alarms in them. (R. 148, 295, 457-8). 
At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men and 
walked into the parking lot to check their trucks. (R. 295) . They 
then walked across the parking lot to a convenience store to buy 
some personal items, but the store was closed. (R. 109, 149, 468). 
As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle observed the two 
young men walk into a field adjacent to the parking lot, then 
return to the parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks that 
were parked there. Judd and Coyle went to their trucks and 
observed the young men from the shadows. (R. 109, 149-50, 295, 
469) . 
The young men approached Judd and Coyle7s trucks and were 
heard to say, "These must be the vehicles with the alarms." Judd 
and Coyle then stepped out from the shadows and told them to stay 
away from their trucks and all other trucks in the parking lot. 
(R. 295) . The two young men ran away into the adjacent field. 
Judd and Coyle walked into the field after them. Approximately 30 
yards into the field, the young men stopped. One of them began 
beating Judd, resulting in very serious injuries that give rise to 
Judd's claim for compensation. (R. 217, 295). 
The fight occurred at approximately 1:57 a.m. (R. 294). 
Hospital blood tests established that Judd had a blood alcohol 
level of .18% at the time the test was taken, after the beating. 
(R. 217) . Judge Allen noted that two hours after Mr. Judd took his 
last drink his alcohol was tested. (R. 24). 
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Mr. Judd filed an application for hearing on November 3, 
1992. (R. 5-6). At the hearing, Mr. Judd testified that he had 
never been instructed what to do when someone is attempting to 
vandalize his truck or cargo. (R. 113). Defendants called Michael 
E. Tracy, a terminal manager at Commercial Carriers. (R. 163). 
Mr. Tracy testified that after a vehicle is vandalized, the drivers 
are instructed to call the police and the company. (R. 165) . 
However, Mr. Tracy testified that drivers have never been 
instructed what to do if they catch somebody "messing with their 
cars or cargo." (R. 165). 
After the hearing, on May 5, 1993, Judge Allen entered 
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Mr. 
Judd his benefits. (R. 19-28). On June 3, 1993, Mr. Judd moved 
the Industrial Commission for a 30-day continuance to file his 
Motion for Review. (R. 29). On June 7, 1993, Judge Allen granted 
Mr. Judd's request for an extension of time. (R. 30). On June 8, 
1993, defendants filed an objection to the Motion for Continuance. 
(R. 31-3 3). However, defendants did not show any substantial 
prejudice in their objection. (R. 31-33). On July 6, 1993, Mr. 
Judd filed his Motion for Review. (R. 34-38). The Industrial 
Commission unanimously reversed the ALJ's decision and awarded Mr. 
Judd his benefits. (R. 50-54). 
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I  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT || 
Defendants have failed to marshall all the evidence as is 
required when contesting the Findings of Fact of an administrative 
hearing. Defendants merely reargue their case. Defendants do not 
cite one paragraph of the Industrial Commission's thirteen 
paragraphs in the Findings of Fact. Additionally, there are 
substantial facts and evidence in the record supporting the 
Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact. Consequently, this court 
must adopt the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact. 
The Industrial Commission correctly applied the law to 
the facts of this case. Mr. Judd was attempting to protect the 
vehicles he was taking cross-country when he was severely beaten. 
Mr. Judd's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. 
Defendants have failed to show that they were 
substantially prejudiced when the Industrial Commission granted Mr. 
Judd a 30-day extension to file his Motion for Review. Also, 
defendants have failed to show that the Industrial Commission acted 
inconsistently pursuant to their claim under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4) (h) (iii) . Defendants are attempting to deny Mr. Judd his 
benefits because the Industrial Commission did not require him to 
show good cause for an extension. This is a technicality, which 
amounts to harmless error. Therefore, this court must deny 
defendants' appeal and affirm the Industrial Commission's Order. 
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I  ARGUMENT || 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When challenging the Findings of Fact in an 
administrative proceeding, defendants must show the factual 
findings are "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court.11 Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendants also have the duty to "marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, 
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Id. (cites 
omitted and emphasis in the original) . In Merriam v. Board of 
Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991), this court stated 
"Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person 'might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Defendants claim that there are only two facts they 
dispute. However, in footnote 4 on page 11 of defendants' brief, 
they state that the "Board's inference is factual in nature and 
constitutes a finding of fact." The Industrial Commission's 
thirteen paragraphs of Findings of Fact show the fight occurred 
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when Mr. Judd tried to protect his truck's cargo. Consequently, 
defendants must marshall all of the evidence that supports and 
contradicts the Industrial Commission's findings that Mr. Judd's 
beating was related to his attempt to protect the trucks. Instead, 
defendants cite only to Judge Allen's order and no independent 
testimony or evidence in the record. Simply stated, defendants 
merely argue the facts that support Judge Allen's hypothesis that 
the fight occurred over the affections of two women. Because 
defendants did not marshall the relevant evidence presented at the 
hearing which supports the Industrial Commission's decision, this 
court must accept the Industrial Commission's factual conclusions. 
Johnson v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. , 842 P.2d 910, 912 
(Utah App. 1992). 
B. DEFENDANTS' ARGUE THE FACTS 
INSTEAD OF MARSHALLING THEM 
The Industrial Commission's Order Granting Motion for 
Review has thirteen paragraphs of Findings of Fact. Amazingly, 
defendants do not cite one paragraph in their brief! Defendants 
are under the mistaken belief that the Industrial Commission has to 
cite to some evidence in the record to support its findings. 
Defendants, not the Industrial Commission, have a duty to marshall 
all of the evidence so this court can "examine both sides of the 
record, and not simply that part of the record which supports the 
ALJ's findings." Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 
(Utah App. 1992). 
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Therefore, Mr. Judd will verify each paragraph of the 
Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact with independent 
references to the record. Mr. Judd will properly marshall the 
evidence and show there is substantial evidence in the record 
supporting the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact. 
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact are as 
follows: 
1. Mr. Judd has been employed as a truck driver by 
Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the 
company's Clearfield, Utah, terminal. (R. 96, 97). 
2. During mid-May, 1992, Mr. Judd and another driver, 
Mr. Coyle, were assigned to drive two trucks loaded 
with new automobiles from Missouri to California. 
(R. 101). 
3. Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21. 
Because they were limited by company policy and/or 
government regulations to driving no more than 10 
hours or 540 miles at a stretch, they stopped at 
Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night. (R. 102). 
4. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Messrs. Judd and Coyle 
located an appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked 
their trucks adjacent to each other in the parking 
lot, checked into their respective rooms, then went 
to the motel's lounge. (R. 105, 106, 291, 292). 
5. In the lounge, Judd and Coyle consumed alcoholic 
beverages. Two women already in the bar, one of 
whom was a slight acquaintance of Judd, joined them 
at their table. To some degree, the women joined 
Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two other 
younger men, who had been asking the women to 
dance. (R. 107, 147, 453). 
6. When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the 
two women to their car and said goodbye. The women 
then drove away. (R. 147-8, 294-5, 456). 
7. At approximately the same time, the two young men 
who had also been in the lounge, struck up a 
conversation with Judd and Coyle. The young men 
suggested that they buy more beer and drink it in 
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their motel room, Judd and Coyle declined the 
offer, stating that it was too late and that they 
had to leave early the next morning. 
(R. 108, 148, 295, 468)• 
8. During the course of this conversation, the young 
men expressed interest in the new cars Coyle and 
Judd were transporting. The young men suggested 
they would like to take one of the cars for a 
drive. Judd told the young men that such use of 
the cars was not permitted, and that the cars all 
had alarms in them. (R. 148, 295, 457-8). 
9. At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men 
and walked into the parking lot to check their 
trucks. (R. 295). They then walked across the 
parking lot to a convenience store to buy some 
personal items, but the store was closed. (R. 109, 
149, 468). 
10. As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle 
observed the two young men walk into a field 
adjacent to the parking lot, then return to the 
parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks 
that were parked there. Judd and Coyle went to 
their trucks and observed the young men from the 
shadows. (R. 109, 149-50, 295, 469). 
11. The young men approached Judd and Coyle7s trucks 
and were heard to say, "These must abe [sic] the 
vehicles with the alarms". [sic] Judd and Coyle 
then stepped out from the shadows and told them to 
stay away from their trucks and all other trucks in 
the parking lot. (R. 295). 
12. The two young men ran away into the field. Judd 
and Coyle walked into the field after them. 
Approximately 30 yards into the field, the young 
men stopped. One of them began beating Judd, 
resulting in very serious injuries that give rise 
to Judd's claim for compensation. (R. 217, 295). 
13. Hospital blood tests established that Judd had a 
blood alcohol level of .18% at the time the test 
was taken, after the beating. (R. 217). 
The Industrial Commission relied upon police reports, 
medical records, and deposition and hearing testimony in making 
11 
their statement of facts. The Industrial Commission's order 
presents enough facts so that this court does not have to "search 
the record to determine whether findings could have been made by 
the Commission to support its order . . . " Mountain States Legal 
Found, v. Public Serv. Comm'n.. 636 P. 2d 1047, 1052 (Utah App. 
1981). There is substantial evidence to support these Findings of 
Fact. 
Defendants mischaracterize Adams v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n. , 821 P. 2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), saying that the 
Industrial Commission, in the present case, did not present enough 
facts to support their Conclusions of Law. In Adams, this court 
stated: 
The Commission's "findings" amount to the 
following single conclusory statement as to 
causation: "The preponderance of medical 
evidence in this case establishes that the 
applicant's various listed symptoms are not 
related to her work as a telemarketer at 
Unicorp." (Emphasis added). 
Adams, 821 P.2d at 5. A single conclusory statement is not the 
same as thirteen paragraphs of Findings of Fact. The Industrial 
Commission has adequate facts for defendants to marshall the 
evidence. 
Defendants want this court to adopt the ALJ's findings 
that the fight arose over the affections of two women. In trying 
to support Judge Allen's fanciful theory, defendants again fail to 
marshall all of the evidence. There is substantial evidence in the 
record contrary to Judge Allen's theory. Mr. Judd testified that 
there were no fights or disturbances or any mishap in the bar 
12 
whatsoever. (R. 107) . The conversation that Mr. Judd and Mr. 
Coyle had with the young men in the bar was "just friendly, casual 
talking." (R. 147). Mr. Judd also testified in his deposition 
that the two young men approached him in the bar in an effort to be 
"chatty and friendly." (R. 456). The two young men also asked if 
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle would like to share some beer with them. 
(R. 148, 295) . The only evidence cited by the defendants, that the 
fight arose over the women, is Judge Allen's order. They do not 
cite any independent evidence to support their theory. Defendants7 
attempt to marshall the evidence is so poorly done that it appears 
that they have: 
[M]erely presented carefully selected facts 
and excerpts of trial testimony in support of 
its position. Such selective citation to the 
record does not begin to marshall the evi-
dence; it is nothing more than an attempt to 
reargue the case before this court—a tactic 
that we reject. 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). 
C. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
IS THE ULTIMATE FACT FINDER 
Moreover, defendants do not seem to understand that the 
Industrial Commission is the ultimate fact finder, not the ALJ. 
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990). 
In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 
1980), the Industrial Commission reversed the ALJ's denial of 
benefits to an injured employee. On appeal, the employer claimed 
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that the Commission could not overturn the ALJ's decision because 
the Commission "did not hear or see the witnesses and took no new 
evidence," .Id, at 810, The Commission's decision overturned the 
ALJ's ruling that the applicant and his wife's statements were 
"self-serving," Id. at 812. The Supreme Court concluded: 
We hold, therefore, that the Commission, 
sitting en banc, if it deems that further 
evidence is not necessary, need not hold 
further hearings, and its review of the record 
made before the Administrative Law Judge, may 
make its own findings on the credibility of 
the evidence presented. The Commission's 
findings so made will not be disturbed by this 
court if they are supported by substantial 
evidence. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 811. In the case at hand, defendants would like this court 
to ignore the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, which were 
supported by substantial evidence, and reinstate the ALJ's order 
simply because the ALJ observed the witnesses' demeanor and 
credibility. Defendants' brief p. 14. Such a decision would run 
contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in U.S. Steel. 
For whatever reason, defendants do not cite to U.S. Steel 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980). Instead, 
they cite to other jurisdictions in an attempt to persuade this 
court that the Industrial Commission did not list enough facts for 
this court to check for substantial evidence. Because defendants 
failed to even list the Findings of Fact of the Industrial 
Commission, their argument is completely meritless. Furthermore, 
the cases they cite are inapposite. 
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What is most troubling to Mr. Judd is how defendants 
continually mischaracterize the evidence in their brief. In 
footnote 5 on page 17 of their brief, they state "Mr. Judd still 
deviated from his course of employment by violating company 
regulations instructing employees to call the police and not to 
pursue vandals." At the hearing defendants' terminal manager, 
Michael E. Tracy, testified that after a vehicle is vandalized the 
drivers are instructed to call the police and the company. (R. 
165) . He then stated: 
Q. What are the drivers instructed to 
do if they find someone messing with 
their cars or cargo? 
A. I don't believe that we have ever 
instructed them of what to do. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(R. 165). That testimony corroborates Mr. Judd's testimony that he 
had never been instructed what to do when someone is trying to 
vandalize his truck or its cargo. (R. 113). There is no evidence 
that it violates company policy to pursue someone attempting to 
vandalize a truck or its cargo, as defendants would like this court 
to believe. 
Also, defendants claim that "There is no evidentiary 
basis in the record for the Board's finding that Mr. Judd checked 
his truck." Defendants' brief, pp. 8, 17. Contrary to this 
erroneous assertion, the police report states: 
He [Coyle] advised at this time these subjects 
walked up and started asking questions about 
the cars that were loaded on their trucks. 
Coyle advised they talked to the two subjects 
for a short time. Coyle advised that he told 
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Judd he was going to go out and check the 
vehicles and their trucks at which time he and 
Judd both went out to their trucks to check 
them. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 295). Defendants either missed this evidence or ignored it. 
In an apparent attempt to prejudice this court, 
defendants raise the irrelevant issue of Mr. Judd's drinking. 
Appellant's state, "During this time Mr. Judd had consumed so much 
alcohol that his blood alcohol level was high enough to have 
dropped to .18% by the next morning." (Emphasis in original). 
Defendants' brief p. 13. The fight occurred at about 1:57 a.m. 
(.R. 294) . Judge Allen noted that two hours after Mr. Judd's last 
drink his alcohol level was tested. (R. 24). Technically, that 
may be "the next morning/" however, it appears to be a brazen 
attempt to mischaracterize the evidence. 
Mr. Judd has shown that the Industrial Commission's order 
is supported by substantial evidence. Defendants have failed 
miserably to marshall all of the evidence in their brief, and they 
have mischaracterized some of the evidence, which is a far cry from 
marshalling it. The only evidence defendants cite in support of 
their theory is Judge Allen's order! There is absolutely no 
objective evidence that this fight was caused by a dispute over the 
affections of two women. Therefore, this court must adopt: the 
Industrial Commissions Findings of Fact. 
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POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE LAW TO THE FACTS 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
After this court accepts the Findings of Fact of the 
Industrial Commission, it then must review the Industrial 
Commissions application of law to those facts using the 
"correction-of-error standard." King v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY AWARDED 
BENEFITS TO MR. JUDD BECAUSE HIS INJURY AROSE 
OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN 
HE WAS SEVERELY BEATEN TRYING TO PROTECT 
HIS TRUCK'S CARGO. 
The Industrial Commission correctly cited to Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-45, which states that "Compensation will be paid to an 
employee, 'who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in 
the course of his employment.'" Id. In M & K Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948), the Utah Supreme 
Court, quoting 71 CJ 644, § 396, stated, "the words 'arising out 
of' are construed to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, 
and the words 'in the course of' refer to the time, place, and 
circumstances under which it occurred. . . . " Id. at 134. 
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1. Mr. Judd's Iniurv Arose Out of His Employment 
The Industrial Commission correctly stated in its 
order, "arising out of employment" requires a causal connection to 
an injury and the employment. It then correctly found a causal 
connection between Mr. Judd's beating and his employment. The 
Commission relied upon the well respected treatise, Larson's 
Workmen's Compensation, in making its decision. In Volume 1, § 11, 
Professor Larson discusses assaults. Volume 1, § 11.11(c) is 
entitled "Assaults as street risk," and it states that the "street-
risk doctrine as applied to assaults is another common application 
of the general rule granting compensation when the assault arises 
out of a risk associated with the situs of the work." Larson's 
Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 1, § 11.11(c). The Industrial 
Commission cited Professor Larson's conclusion to this section, 
which states, "The controlling test should be 'if the circumstances 
of the employment can be fairly said to have elicited conduct by 
the employee which results in his injury.'" Id. 
In the case at hand, the Industrial Commission concluded 
that Mr. Judd was at a motel pre-approved by the employer, that Mr. 
Judd was required to keep the cargo safe, and that Mr. Judd checked 
to see what some young men were doing around his truck. When the 
young men ran into the adjacent field, Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle 
walked into the field to insure that the young men had left. When 
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle saw that the young men had not left, Mr. 
Judd and Mr. Coyle approached them, whereupon the young men 
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severely beat Mr. Judd. The Commission then concluded that Mr. 
Judd's employment placed him in the situation where he was beaten. 
Furthermore, Professor Larson discusses fights involving 
employees in § 11.15(a) of his treatise, which the Commission cited 
as follows: 
If the fight is spontaneous and closely entangled 
with the work itself—as most are—the assertion 
that the claimant left his employment is an 
outright fiction; and fictions should not be 
invented to block benefits conferred by a remedial 
statute. 
Larson's Workman's Compensation, Vol. 1, § 11.15(a). 
Presently, defendants have attempted to create several 
fictions in an attempt to deny Mr. Judd his statutory benefits. 
First, they claim the fight arose over the affections of two women. 
"Fiction" or "fable" accurately describe such an absurd inference. 
Second, defendants try to create a fiction that, because the fight 
occurred thirty yards from the trucks that Mr. Judd's employment 
terminated. Lastly, defendants create another fiction by claiming 
that, because the fight occurred after Mr. Judd's working hours, it 
was not in the course of his employment. 
The fight arose because some young men were attempting to 
vandalize the cars and Mr. Judd tried to stop them. It was Mr. 
Judd's job to safely transport the cars. The fight was spontaneous 
and closely entangled with his job. Therefore, the fight arose out 
of his employment. 
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2. Mr. Judd Was Injured in the 
Course of His Employment 
Again, the Industrial Commission correctly cites to 
Larson's Workman's Compensationf Vol. 1, § 14.00, which states: 
The course of employment . . . demands that 
the injury be shown to have arisen within the 
time and space boundaries of the employment, 
and in the course of an activity whose purpose 
is related to the employment. 
Id. In M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 
132 (Utah 1948), the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he requirement that the accident arise in 
the course of the employment is satisfied if 
it occurs while the employee is rendering 
service to his employer which he was hired to 
do or doing something incidental thereto, at 
the time when and the place where he was 
authorized to render such service. 
M & K Corp., 189 P.2d at 134. This court, in Walls v. Industrial 
Comm'n. of Utah, 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993), discusses what is 
necessary for an employee to be "in the course of" his or her 
employment. Jd. at 967. This court denied Walls' benefits because 
she had stopped working and was merely socializing at the bar when 
she offered to help move a keg of beer. Walls, 857 P.2d at 966. 
The dissent felt she was entitled to benefits and cited Maintenance 
Meruit.. Inc. v. Tinkel, 40 Colo. App. 80, 570 P.2d 840 (1977). In 
response to the dissent's position, the majority, in footnote 4, 
distinguished the Colorado case as follows: 
That case [Maintenance Momt.. Inc.] stands for 
the proposition that when an employer only 
fixes an employee's general work time, and the 
employer benefits from a departure from the 
20 
schedule, injuries sustained in that departure 
are within the course of employment. Id. 570 
P.2d at 842-43. In the present case, Walls's 
employer fixed a particular work schedule, not 
just general working hours, and the deviation 
was not one from the schedule, but one that 
took place several hours after her scheduled 
employment had ended. 
Walls, 857 P.2d at 970. 
Mr. Judd had a general work time. He could drive for 10 
hours or 54 0 miles in a day. Mr. Judd then departed from that work 
schedule by checking his cargo to insure its safety. Mr. Judd was 
"rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do . . . 
at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render 
such service." M & K Corp., 189 P.2d at 134. 
Defendants do not dispute Mr. Judd had a responsibility 
to bring those vehicles safely to their destination. Because Mr. 
Judd was insuring the safety of those vehicles and was injured in 
performing that duty, he was acting within the course of his 
employment. 
In a footnote, defendants make a weak argument that Mr. 
Judd deviated from his employment because he allegedly violated 
company regulations in pursuing the vandals. As shown above, there 
are no company regulations telling drivers not to "pursue" 
potential vandals. In support of this contention, defendants cite 
M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 
(1948). Had defendants carefully read M & K Corp., they would not 
be making this erroneous assertion. The Supreme Court in M & K 
Corp., stated: 
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Not every violation bv an employee of a 
statutory provision of a rule or regulation of 
his employer constitutes a departure from the 
course of his employment. The general rule is 
that where the employee, at the time of the 
accident, is engaged in doing a thing or 
rendering a service which he is employed or 
authorized to do, either expressly or by the 
nature of and the surrounding facts and 
circumstances of his employment, or is doing 
something which is incidental thereto, but 
does such act or renders such service or 
incidental in an unlawful or forbidden manner, 
he does not thereby depart from the course of 
his employment even though the accident occurs 
as a consequence of such violation. It is 
only when the act or service which the 
employee is performing is itself prohibited, 
as distinguished from the manner in which the 
act is done or the service is performed, that 
the violation of a statutory provision or of a 
rule or regulation of the employer takes the 
employee outside of the course of his 
employment and defeats a recovery. (Emphasis 
added). 
M & K Corp. , 189 P. 2d at 138. The court further stated that 
whether the violation of a statute or employer's regulation takes 
an employee out of the course of his employment is an area "for 
great diversions of opinion. No comprehensive, all-inclusive rule 
has been or can be stated which will determine all cases, each case 
has to be determined on its own facts." Id. at 139. 
Mr. Judd was not forbidden by law or company policy to 
check his vehicles to insure their safety. If Mr. Judd had been 
forbidden to check the vehicles, then it would not matter how he 
was checking them and he would be barred from compensation. Mr. 
Judd was responsible for those vehicles, and when he checked them 
he found two young men trying to break into them. He yelled at the 
young men, walked into the adjacent field after them to insure that 
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they had left, and then was severely beaten by the young men. 
Therefore, he did not leave the course of his employment. 
Defendants cite to Dale v. Trade Street, Inc. 854 P. 2d 
828 (Mont. 1993) in support of their argument that Mr. Judd has 
deviated from his employment. Dale is easily distinguishable. 
Dale was a truck driver delivering a load of lumber from Montana to 
Michigan. His sister lived in Mile City, Montana and he stopped to 
see her on his way to Michigan. Dale parked his truck at a Flying 
J truck stop near Mile City and his brother came and picked him up 
to drive him into Mile City. On the way into Mile City they were 
in a single car accident and both were injured. The Montana 
Supreme Court's focus was whether or not Dale's visit was "a 
substantial deviation from Dale's employment." Id. at 832. 
Mr. Jucid's beating is significantly different. Because 
he was protecting his cargo, that can hardly be construed as a 
deviation from his employment. Defendants have not cited one case 
in support of thsir theory with facts similar to this. 
Larson reports on a California case with facts strikingly 
similar to the case at hand, Martinez v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 
15 Cal. 3d 982, 544 P.2d 1350 (1976). Larson states the case as 
follows: 
The claimant, a member of the parish council, 
was engaged to help operate the beer booth at 
a church fiesta. In the evening, after his 
duties were finished, he heard that some 
youths were stealing beer from the booth. 
Finding some youths on the church premises 
with beer, the claimant assumed it was stolen 
and attempted to retrieve it. A fight ensued 
in which the claimant was brutally beaten. 
23 
Compensation was awarded on the theory that 
the claimant thought he was protecting his 
employer's property. The court stressed that 
in an emergency the actor's judgment should 
not be too severely judged, so long as he 
acted in good faith. Nor was his act of 
grabbing the beer "aggression" under the 
California statute, since obviously the 
claimant was not intending the harm anyone. 
Moreover, the fact that the episode took place 
outside the claimant's working hours was 
immaterial. 
Larson's Workman's Compensation, Vol. 1, § 11.15(a), footnote 46.1. 
Mr. Judd has attached a copy of this case as Addendum C to this 
brief. 
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle were staying at the motel 
designated by their employer, and parked their trucks in an area 
they felt was the best spot available. Later that night they 
checked their vehicles and the cargo to insure their safety, and 
upon inspection tried to fend off some young men attempting to 
vandalize the cargo. In their effort to protect their employer's 
cargo, Mr. Judd was severely beaten. In an emergency situation, 
the conduct of the employee should not be looked at too harshly. 
Martinez, 544 P.2d at 1350. All of these facts are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. As shown in Point I, there is 
absolutely no credible evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion 
that the fight arose over the attention of two women. 
Consequently, Mr. Judd's injury arose out of and in the course of 
his employment when he was severely beaten in trying to protect his 
truck's cargo. 
24 
3. Because Mr. Judd's Injury Arose in a 
Fiaht Over the Vehicles, Defendants7 
Contention That the Industrial Commission 
Erred When it Stated the Fiaht Was Closely 
Entangled to the Work Even if it Were Over 
the Affections of the Women is Moot. 
The facts of this case show that Mr. Judd was 
protecting the cargo of his truck, and there is no objective 
evidence that the fight arose over the affections of the women. It 
is moot to further discuss the Industrial Commission7s statement 
that even if the fight were over the women, Mr. Judd would be 
awarded benefits. 
POINT III. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING MR. JUDD 
A THIRTY DAY EXTENSION TO FILE 
HIS MOTION FOR REVIEW 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendants claim that the Industrial Commission abused 
its discretion by granting a 30-day extension to Mr. Judd because 
he did not show just cause. Defendants rely on Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii), which states: 
The Appellate Court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
agency action [that] is contrary to the 
agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts 
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
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rational basis for the inconsistency; 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. Because this is an interpretation of the statute, this court 
reviews it under the "correction-of-error standard." Morton 
Intern, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). 
B. EVEN IF THE ERROR OCCURRED, DEFENDANTS HAVE 
FAILED TO SHOW HOW THEY WERE SUBSTANTIALLY 
PREJUDICED 
If an error has occurred, this court can only grant 
relief if defendants have "been substantially prejudiced" by the 
error. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). Also, defendants have the 
burden of "showing not only that the error occurred, but that it 
was substantial and prejudicial in that the Appellant was deprived 
in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed 
issues by the jury." (Emphasis added). Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P. 2d 
147, 154 (Utah 1987). Furthermore, this court, in Adams v. Board 
of Review of Indus. Comm., 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), stated: 
[T]he substantial prejudice language in 
Section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an appellate 
court from granting relief if the agency error 
is harmless. The supreme court defined 
harmless error as being an error "sufficiently 
inconsequential that . . . there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." (Citations 
omitted and emphasis added). 
Id. at 7. 
Defendants are quick to cite to Utah R. Civ. P., 6(b) in 
support of their claim that the request for extension was not 
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timely filed. However, defendants ignore Utah R. Civ. P., 61, 
which states: 
fN]o error or defect in any ruling or order or 
in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is ground for granting a 
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court, at every 
stage of the proceeding, must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not effect the substantial rights of the 
parties. (Emphasis added). 
Id. 
In the case at hand, defendants claim "this unwarranted 
extension prejudiced Commercial Carriers because the Board 
ultimately granted Mr. Judd's Motion for Review." Defendants brief 
p. 19. Defendants do not even attempt to show that the Industrial 
Commission substantially prejudiced their claim. "Substantially 
prejudiced" means that they were "deprived in some manner of a full 
and fair consideration of the disputed issues" by the Industrial 
Commission. See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). 
The extension did not preclude them from presenting additional 
testimony, adding to the record in any fashion, or filing any 
additional motions. 
Furthermore, defendants7 Appeal also violates Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-33, which states: 
A substantial compliance with the requirements 
of this title shall be sufficient to give 
effect to the orders of the Commission, and 
they shall not be declared inoperative, 
illegal or void for any omission of a 
technical nature. 
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Id. Defendants want this court to believe that, because Mr. Judd 
did not state "good cause" for his Motion for an Extension, he 
should not receive his benefits. Because defendants cannot show 
that they were substantially prejudiced, this appears to be a 
technicality upon which they are trying to overturn the 
Commission's Order. 
C. DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED INCONSISTENTLY 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) requires defendants 
to show that the agency has acted contrary to its prior practice. 
Defendants cite to Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial 
Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993), in support of this 
position. However, the facts of Maverick differ from the facts in 
the present case. 
In Maverick, the Petitioner filed his Motion for Review 
one day after the 30-day time limit had run. Id. at 946. After 
the Industrial Commission denied the request for review, Maverick 
requested the Industrial Commission to reconsider. Id. The basis 
for the Commission's denial was that Maverick had not shown good 
cause for the extension. Id. 
In the case at hand, Mr. Judd filed a request for 
extension one day prior to the cut-off. This Motion was granted. 
Because the facts of Maverick and this case are significantly 
different, defendants have failed to show the Industrial Commission 
acted inconsistently from prior practice. 
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In Pease v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984) , Pease sent the Industrial Commission a letter 
requesting a "motion for review," but without specifying any 
alleged errors in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or 
Order. Id. at 614. Pease also asked for an extension. Id. The 
Industrial Commission "treated the letter as a request for 
extension of time . . . ." Id. Because the letter had been filed 
timely, the court granted the extension. The facts of Pease are 
more in line with the facts of this case. The Industrial 
Commission, in the past, has granted extensions for letters timely 
filed with the Commission. 
Defendants have failed to show that they were 
substantially prejudiced by the Industrial Commission's granting of 
a 3 0-day extension. Furthermore, because defendants have a 
meritless case, they are trying to take Mr. Judd's benefits away 
from him because of a technicality. Such a tactic runs contrary to 
the Workers7 Compensation statutes and the harmless error standard. 
Also, defendants have failed to show that the Industrial Commission 
acted contrary to prior practice in granting Mr. Judd a 30-day 
extension. Therefore, defendants7 appeal must be denied and Mr. 
Judd awarded his benefits, including interest. 
I  CONCLUSION [I 
Defendants contest the Industrial Commission's Findings 
of Fact. Defendants state the Industrial Commission's finding that 
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the fight arose while Mr. Judd was trying to protect his truck's 
cargo is a factual finding. Consequently, the defendants had a 
duty to marshall all of the evidence supporting that finding. 
Defendants failed miserably to do so. They simply reargued facts 
that support the ALJ's finding, which was erroneous. There is 
absolutely no objective evidence that the fight arose over the 
affections of two women. In fact, there is substantial evidence to 
the contrary, which defendants also failed to marshall. Because 
defendants failed to marshall the evidence, this court must affirm 
the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact. 
The Industrial Commission correctly applied the law to 
the facts of this case in finding that Mr. Judd's injury arose out 
of and in the course of his employment. Mr. Judd had a duty to 
transport his cargo in a safe fashion. He was staying in a motel 
approved by his employer. As he was getting ready to go to bed, he 
checked his trucks and saw two young men attempting to vandalize 
his truck's cargo. Mr. Judd yelled at them and the two young men 
ran about 3 0 yards into a field which was adjacent to the trucks. 
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle walked into the field after them to insure 
that they had left. The young men had not left and turned upon Mr. 
Judd and Mr. Coyle and severely beat Mr. Judd. This did not 
violate any company policy because Mr. Judd had never been 
instructed what to do if he catches somebody attempting to 
vandalize his vehicle. Mr. Judd's attempt to protect his truck's 
cargo was within the course of his employment. Consequently, his 
injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. 
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Defendants have failed to show that they were 
substantially prejudiced when the Industrial Commission granted Mr. 
Judd a 3 0-day extension to file his Motion for Review, 
Furthermore, defendants have failed to show that the Industrial 
Commission acted inconsistently with prior conduct. Therefore, 
because defendants have failed to show substantial prejudice or 
inconsistency by the Industrial Commission, the error is a harmless 
error. Therefore, defendants7 attempt to deny Mr. Judd his 
rightful benefits are based upon a technicality and must be denied. 
This court must affirm the Industrial Commission's Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of August, 1994. 
SYKES & VILOS, P.C. 
EUGlftJE C. MILLER/ JR. / 
Attorney f o r A p p l i c a n t / A p p e l l e e 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this 23rd day of August, 1994, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE RONNY L. 
JUDD were hand delivered to the parties at the following address: 
Anne Swensen 
Julianne R. Blanch 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
1402\appeal\reply.823 
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ADDENDUM A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
35-1-33- Orders not to be set aside on technicalities. 
A substantial compliance with the requirements of this title shall be suffi-
cient to give effect to the orders of the commission, and they shall not be 
declared inoperative, illegal or void for any omission of a technical nature. 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the depen-
dents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the^ 
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely seTf-inflicted', shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record;
 # 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record: or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied: 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History-: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. ings before State Tax Commission, junsdicrion 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect m any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement, When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued exis-
tence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to 
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. WTien a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as other-
wise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some 
other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
ADDENDUM B 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE NO. 92-
RONNIE LYN JUDD, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS AND OLD * 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE, * 
Defendants. * 
Ronny Lyn Judd seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's 
Order denying him compensation under Utah's Workers Compensation 
Act.1 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
The issue before the Commission is whether Mr. Judd's injuries 
arose out of and in the course of his employment, as required by 
§35-1-45 of the Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission makes the following findings of fact: 
1. Mr. Judd h^s been employed as a truck driver by 
Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the company's 
Clearfield, Utah terminal. 
2. During mid-May, 1992, Mr. Judd and another driver, Mr. 
Coyle, were assigned to drive two trucks loaded with new 
automobiles from Missouri to California. 
3. Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21. 
Because they were limited by company policy and/or government 
regulation to driving no more than 10 hours or 54 0 miles at a 
stretch, they stopped at Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night. 
4. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Judd and Coyle located an 
appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked their trucks adjacent to 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq. 
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each other in the parking lot, checked into their respective rooms, 
then went to the motel's lounge. 
5. In the lounge, Judd and Coyle consumed alcoholic 
beverages. Two women already in the bar, one of whom was a slight 
acquaintance of Judd, joined them at their table. To some degree, 
the women joined Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two 
other younger men, who had been asking the women to dance. 
6. When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the two 
women to their car and said goodby. The women then drove away. 
7. At approximately the same time, the two young men who had 
also been in the lounge struck up a conversation with Judd and 
Coyle. The young men suggested they buy more beer and drink it in 
their motel room. Judd and Coyle declined the offer, stating it 
was too late and that they had to leave early the next morning. 
8. During the course of this conversation, the young men 
expressed interest in the new cars Coyle and Judd were 
transporting. The young men suggested they would like to take one 
of the cars for a drive. Judd told the young men that such use of 
the cars was not permitted and that the cars all had alarms in 
them. 
9. At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men and 
walked into the parking lot to check their trucks. They then 
walked across the parking lot to a convenience store to buy some 
personal items, but the store was closed. 
..' 10. As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle observed 
the two young men walk into a field adjacent to the parking lot, 
then return to the parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks 
that were parked there. Judd and Coyle went to their trucks and 
observed the young men from the shadows. 
11. The young men approached Judd and Coyle's trucks and were 
heard to say "these must -abe the vehicles with the alarms". Judd 
and Coyle then stepped out from the shadows and told them to stay 
away from their trucks and all the other trucks in the parking lot. 
12. The two young men ran away into the field. Judd and 
Coyle walked into the field after them. Approximately 3 0 yards 
into the field, the young men stopped. One of them began beating 
Judd, resulting in very serious injuries that give rise to Judd's 
claim for compensation. 
13. Hospital blood tests establish that Judd had a blood 
alcohol level of .18% at the time the test was taken, after the 
beating. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION 
As a preliminary note, the Commission has essentially accepted 
the ALJ's determination of every point of disputed fact. Thus, as 
far as the objective facts are concerned, there is no variance 
between the Commission and the ALJ's findings. However, the 
Commission does not accept the inferences the ALJ has drawn from 
those objective facts. In particular, the Commission finds no 
basis to conclude that Judd's beating was the outgrowth of a 
dispute over the women at the bar. 
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides 
compensation to each employees "who is injured . . . by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment." In the case 
of Mr. Judd, it is conceded that he was injured and that the injury 
was by accident, as that term is used in the workers' compensation 
law. The only issues that are disputed are whether his injury: 1) 
arose out of his employment; and 2) arose in the course of his 
employment. Those two issues are discussed in that order below. 
I. ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT 
As noted by the ALJ's decision, in workers' compensation law 
the term "arising out of employment" requires a causal connection 
between the injury and the employment. Neither the parties nor the 
ALJ have cited any Utah appellate decisions which specifically 
apply the foregoing requirement to facts similar to this case. 
However, Professor Larson discusses the subject: 
The controlling test should be 'if the circumstances of 
the employment can be fairly said to have elicited 
conduct by the employee which results in his injury.' 
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §11.11(c), 
p. 3-205.) 
More specifically with respect to fights involving employees, 
Professor Larson states: 
If the fight is spontaneous and closely entangled with 
the work itself, as most are, ths assertion that the 
claimant left his employment is an outright fiction, and 
fictions should not be invented to block benefits 
conferred by remedial statutes. (Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §11.15(a), p. 243.) 
It is difficult to imagine a situation where an employee's 
work could be more entangled with an ensuing fight. Judd presence 
in Kearney and at the very motel where the injury occurred was 
just one stop on a continuing work assignment. The very nature of 
his employment involved the transport and concomitant safe 
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RONNY LYN JUDD 
ORDER 
PAGE FOUR 
keeping of his truck and its cargo. The fight resulted from Judd 
and Coyle's efforts to keep the other men away from the trucks. 
The Commission notes the hypothesis that Judd's beating 
resulted from a fight over women rather than a fight over the truck 
and cars. There is no objective evidence to support that 
hypothesis and the Commission does not accept it. However, even if 
the hypothesis were true, the beating was still "closely entangled 
with the work itselfff. The Commission therefore finds that Judd's 
injuries arose out of his employment. 
II. IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
As noted above, not only must an employee's injury "arise out" 
of the employment to be compensable: it must also be "in the 
course of" the employment. 
The term "in the course of employment" requires both that the 
injury arise within the time and space boundaries of the employment 
and in the course of an activity related to the employment. 
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §14.00, page 
4-1.) 
As a truck driver on assignment, Judd's injuries clearly arose 
within the time and space boundaries of his employment. Even 
though Judd had parked his truck some hours earlier and had spent 
time in the motel lounge, any such personal deviation from his work 
duties ended when Judd and Coyle checked their trucks after 
leaving the lounge, then returned to the trucks out of a suspicion 
that the two younger men might have theft or vandalism in mind. 
For the same reasons, the Commission finds that Judd's 
injuries arose in the course of an activity related to his 
employment. 
The question of whether Judd and Coyle exercised good judgment 
is not relevant to this discussion, as the negligence of an 
employee is not a bar to workers' compensation benefits. As to 
Judd's intoxication, the Commission recognizes that both Judd and 
Coyle had been drinking on the night in question and that Judd had 
a blood alcohol level high enough to render him unfit to operate a 
motor vehicle. While §35-1-14 of the Act requires a 15% reduction 
in compensation when injury is caused from the intoxication of the 
employee, the facts before it do not allow the Commission to 
conclude that Judd's intoxication caused his injuries. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr. 
Judd's injury suffered during the early morning hours of May 22, 
1992, in Kearney Nebraska, arose out of and in the course of his 
employment by Commercial Carriers. 
DECISION 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge in this matter is 
reversed and the workers' compensation claim of Ronny Lyn Judd is 
hereby reinstated. This matter is remanded to the Adjudication 
Division of the Industrial Commission of Utah for such further 
action as is required on Mr. Judd's claim, consistent with this 
decision. It is so ordered. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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| Stephen 0. MARTINEZ, Petitioner, 
v. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS 
BOARD and Roman Catholic Bishop 
of San Diego et al., Respondents. 
L. A. 30515. 
Supreme Court of California. 
Feb. 2, 1976. 
As Modified March 1, 1976. 
Volunteer church worker and member 
of its parish council sought workmen's 
compensation for injuries sustained in al-
tercation while he was attempting to pre-
vent loss of church property by theft dur-
ing church fund-raising activity on church 
premises. The Workers' Compensation 
Appeals Board denied compensation and 
the claimant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Richardson, J., held that the emer-
gency effort by volunteer acting in good 
faith to save church's property constituted 
act performed within the course of em-
ployment entitling him to compensation. 
Decision of Board annulled and cause 
remanded. 
1. Workmen's Compensation <§=>1939.4(4) 
Factual determinations of Workers' 
Compensation Appeals Board must be up-
held if findings are supported by substan-
tial evidence in light of entire record. 
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 5952(d). 
2. Workmen's Compensation <§=>627 
Emergency effort by employee acting 
in good faith to save his employer's prop-
erty from loss by theft constitutes an act 
performed within the course of employment 
entitling claimant to workmen's compensa-
tion benefits even if rescue effort takes 
place outside of working hours. 
3. Workmen's Compensation <§=*I360 
Employee bears burden of proving that 
his injury was sustained in the course of 
his employment. 
4. Workmen's Compensation <§=52, 610 
Workmen's Compensation Act must be 
liberally construed in employee's favor and 
all reasonable doubts as to whether an in-
jury arose out of employment are to be re-
solved in favor of the employee. 
5. Workmen's Compensation <S=627 
An "emergency" for purpose of apply-
ing rule that work-related emergency activ-
ities are compensable may be deemed to ex-
ist whenever an employee faces an immedi-
ate and apparent on-the-premises theft of 
his employer's property. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Workmen's Compensation <§=627 
Injury to claimant, a volunteer worker 
for church and member of its parish coun-
cil which organized and supervised church 
fund-raising activity held on church prem-
ises, while attempting to prevent the theft 
of church's property from its premises, 
which parish council determined would be 
policed by its members rather than hiring 
security guard, rose by reason of act per-
formed within the course of employment 
for church employer and was compensable. 
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 5952(d). 
7. Workmen's Compensation <§=M593 
Action of claimant member of church's 
parish council, which had voted to police 
church fund-raising activity on church 
premises, in grabbing youth who possessed 
what claimant felt was property of church 
did not constitute an act of aggression 
which would render him ineligible for com-
pensation for injuries received in the ensu-
ing altercation. West's Ann.Labor Code, 
§§ 3600, 3600(g). 
8. Workmen's Compensation <§=678 
In view of the statutory policy of lib-
eral construction in favor of injured work-
man, the provision denying compensation 
in case claimant is the aggressor must be 
narrowly and strictly construed, and the 
initial physical aggressor is the one who 
first engages in physical conduct which a 
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reasonable man would perceive to be real, 
present and apparent threat of bodily 
harm. West's Ann.Labor Code, §§ 3600, 
3600(g). 
Thompson, Talbott & Lemaster and 
George D. Thompson, Pomona, tor peti-
tioner. 
Chernow & Lieb and Donald C. Lieb, 
Los Angeles, for respondents. 
j _ R I C H A R D S O N , Justice. 
Petitioner Stephen O. Martinez was 
beaten and seriously injured while attempt-
ing to prevent the theft of his employer's 
property. The sole question before us is 
whether petitioner is entitled to recover 
workers' compensation for the injuries he 
incurred. We have concluded that emer-
gency efforts by an employee acting in 
good faith to save his employer's property 
from loss by theft constitute acts per-
formed within the course of employment, 
and that accordingly petitioner should be 
afforded compensation benefits. 
Petitioner was a member of the parish 
council of Our Lady of Guadalupe Roman 
Catholic Church of Chino. The council was 
composed of various church members ap-
pointed by the parish priest to organize 
and supervise volunteer, service-type activ-
ities. A fiesta was planned by the council 
for June 17, 1973, to raise funds to buy a 
new air conditioning unit for the church. 
The festivities were to be held on church 
premises and were to include carnival-type 
games and the sale of food and beer. 
Among the topics discussed by the council 
during its planning sessions was the sub-
ject of security; evidently some concern 
existed regarding possible disturbances by 
intoxicated persons and others who might 
attempt to disrupt the fiesta. To avoid the 
expense of hiring security guards, the 
council voted to assume the task itself by 
policing its own party. 
Petitioner's specific duty was to assist in 
^ e operation of the beer booth. He 
and children. After his dinner, petitioner 
strolled around the fiesta with his family. 
Although there were enough volunteers to 
operate the beer booth, petitioner neverthe-
less regularly checked the booth to see if 
his help was needed. During his walks, he 
received several reports that teenagers were 
pilfering beer from the stock used to re-
supply the booth. Petitioner's initial efforts 
to locate the offenders were{unsuccessful, 
but at 8 p. m. he encountered a group of 
juveniles on the church premises in pos-
session of beer which petitioner believed 
to be stolen. (Petitioner may have been 
mistaken, as his employer's beer was chilled 
and the beer in the juveniles' possession was 
warm. However, the mere passage of time 
might have accounted for the apparent dif-
ference in temperature.) 
Petitioner asked one of the youths to re-
turn a six-pack of beer he was then hold-
ing. The youth responded with profanity, 
and petitioner grabbed him and attempted 
to retrieve the six-pack; a fight ensued 
and petitioner was hit on the head with a 
wine bottle and brutally beaten and kicked 
by his assailants. As petitioner's employer 
(the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Die-
go) had obtained a workers' compensation 
insurance policy covering volunteer work-
ers, petitioner filed a compensation claim. 
(See Lab.Code, § 3363.6.) 
Following a hearing, the workers' com-
pensation judge (formerly referee) found 
that petitioner was engaged in protecting 
his employer's property when the incident 
occurred and that this activity was so 
closely related to petitioner's employment 
duties as to justify compensability for peti-
tioner's injuries. On petition for reconsid-
eration, the Workers' Compensation Ap-
peals Board declined to adopt the judge's 
recommendation, holding that petitioner's 
injuries were not incurred within the 
course of his employment. In particular, 
the board found (1) that petitioner's beer 
booth duties terminated at 4:30 p. m., and 
(2) that petitioner had no duty to investi-
worked there from noon until 4:30 p. m. gate theft, as he was not hired as a security 
when he left to have dinner with his wife guard. 
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[1] It is well established that the fac-
tual determinations of the board must he 
upheld if its findings are supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the light of the entire 
record. (Lab.Code, § 5952, subd. (d ) ; 
LeVesque v. Workynens Comp. App. Bd., 1 
Cal.3d 627, 637, 83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d 
432.) In the present case, it is questiona-
ble whether the board's findings are found-
ed upon substantial evidence. Certainly, 
petitioner, as a volunteer worker, consid-
ered himself "on call" at the beer booth 
whenever his services were needed, for he 
regularly returned to the booth to ascertain 
whether enough volunteer help existed. 
Moreover, although he was not formally 
hired as a security guard, he was a mem-
ber of the church council which had voted 
to "self-police" the affair. Thus, it is ar-
guable that petitioner was engaged in both 
"beer booth" and "security" activities at 
the time he was injured. 
J986 _L.[2] We need not rest our decision upon 
such narrow grounds, however, for even if 
petitioner had completed his employment 
duties at the time of the incident in ques-
tion, he should be permitted to recover 
compensation under the present circum-
stances. As a recognized authority in the 
compensation area has explained, "[i]t is 
too obvious for discussion that emergency 
efforts to save the employer's property 
from fire, theft, . . . or other hazards 
are within the course of employment. The 
fact that the rescue effort takes place^ out-
side of working hoars does not detract 
from its work-connected status" (1 Lar-
son, Workmen's Compensation Law (1972) 
§ 28.11, pp. 5-269, 5-270, italics added and 
fns. omitted; see also, 2 Hanna, Cal.Law 
of Employee Injuries and Workmen's 
Compensation (2d ed. 1975) § 9.01 [2], p. 
9-7.) Years ago, in an analogous situa-
tion, we held compensable a stable hand's 
injuries sustained during his attempt to 
rescue a child endangered by a horse on 
the employer's premises. (Ocean A. & G. 
Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1919) 180 
Cal. 389, 182 P. 35.) As we stated, "To be 
sure, he was not employed to rescue chil-
dren. But certainly it was reasonably 
within the course of his employment, with-
in the scope of those things which might 
reasonably be expected of him as an em-
ployee, that he should attempt to prevent 
an accident on his employer's premises 
. . If, in this case, Nelson, instead 
of being injured in an attempt to prevent a 
child being run over on his employer's 
premises by an officer of his employer 
there on his company's business, had been 
injured in an attempt to put out an incipi-
ent fire accidently started in the barn, it is 
hardly possible that any question would 
have been made. Yet there is no real dis-
tinction between the two cases. Nelson 
was no more employed to put out fires 
than he was to rescue children. The point 
is that the danger which threatened, and in 
attempting to remove which he was hurt, 
was one which threatened his employer 
and directly concerned it, and with which 
Nelson was confronted in the discharge of 
his customary duties." (Pp. 392-393, 182 
P. p. 36.) 
Similarly, in the present case, although 
petitioner may not have been employed to 
prevent theft of his employer's property, it 
was reasonably within the course of his em-
ployment that he might attempt to do so. 
As stated in a recent case, "Whether a 
particular activity be classified by the 
term's [sic] response to an emergency, res-
cue, personal comfort or convenience, rec-
reation, exercise, courtesy, or common de-
cency, the point is that the activity was 
reasonably to be contemplated because of 
its general nature as a normal human re-
sponse in a particular situation or in some 
cases because of its being recognized as an 
acceptable practice in the particular place 
by custom. Human services cannot be em-
ployed |without taking the whole package." | m 
(North American Rockwell Corp. v. Work-
men's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 9 Cal.App. 
3d 154, 159, 87 Cal.Rptr. 774, 777 [injury 
sustained in employer-furnished parking 
area while assisting fellow employee].) 
[3,4] Similarly, in Johnson v. Chicago 
& N. W. Ry. Co. (1942) 69 S.D. I l l , 7 N. 
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W.2d 145, the court held compensable an 
injury sustained by a railroad employee 
who was injured when he attempted to 
stop his assailants from stealing his em-
ployer's coal. Despite the fact that the 
workman was hired to shovel coal rather 
than act as a watchman or guard, the court 
held that an employee does not leave the 
course of his employment when he acts to 
protect his employer's property from theft. 
The Johnson rationale should apply with 
equal force to injuries recieved on the em-
ployment premises by an off-duty employee 
while attempting to prevent such a theft. 
As we recently observed in Garza v. 
Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal. 
3d 312, 90 Cal.Rptr. 355, 475 P.2d 451; 
"Although the employee bears the burden 
of proving that his injury was sustained in 
the course of his employment', the estab-
lished legislative policy is that the Work-
men's Compensation Act must be liberally 
construed in the employee's favor (Lab. 
Code, § 3202), and all reasonable doubts as 
to whether an injury arose out of employ-
ment are to be resolved in favor of the 
employee. [Citations.] This rule is bind-
ing upon the board and this court" (P. 
317, 90 Cal.Rptr. p. 358, 475 P.2d p. 454.) 
[5,6] Courts have not been precise in 
defining the types of situations which con-
stitute an "emergency" for purposes of 
applying the rule that work-related emer-
gency activities are compensable. (See 
Larson, supra, § 28.13, pp. 1-276, 5-277.) 
We believe, however, that an "emergency" 
may be deemed to exist whenever an em-
ployee faces an immediate, and apparent, 
on-the-premises theft of his employer's 
property. Moreover, according to Larson, 
"[ i ] t is a well-established principle, even at 
common law, that the actor's judgment 
about the existence of an emergency and 
how to meet it should not be too severely 
judged in retrospect. He may get the ben-
efit of the emergency doctrine even if the 
only emergency was in his imagination, if 
he acted in good faith!' {Id., p. 5-277, 
fns. omitted, italics added.) It appears un-
contradicted that petitioner acted in a good 
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faith attempt to prevent an on-going theft 
of his employer's property. 
[7] Respondents suggest that petitioner 
herein acted as an "aggressor" in initiating 
the "altercation" which resulted in his in-
juries and that,(accordingly, he should be 
denied compensation on that ground. (See 
Lab.Code, § 3600, subd. (g) [compensation 
denied when applicant is the "initial physi-
cal aggressor" in an "altercation"].) We 
do not believe, however, that petitioner's 
act in grabbing the youth who possessed the 
six-pack of beer in question constituted an 
act of aggression within the meaning of 
section 3600. 
[8] We recently had occasion to review 
the principles underlying the aggressor 
provision in Mathews v. Workmen's Comp. 
Appeals Bd. (1972), 6 CaUd 719, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 301, 493 P.2d 1165. Initially, we not-
ed that in view of the statutory policy of 
liberal construction in favor of injured 
workers, the aggressor provision itself-
"must be narrowly and strictly construed. 
[Citation.]" (P. 726, 100 Cal.Rptr. p. 305, 
493 P.2d p. 1169.) We next explained that 
" . . . an 'initial physical aggressor' is 
one who first engages in physical conduct 
which a reasonable man would perceive to 
be a * "real, present and apparent threat of 
bodily harm. . . . ' " [Citation.]" (P. 
727, 100 Cal.Rptr. p. 305, 493 P.2d p. 1169, 
fn. omitted.) In the instant case, it is 
doubtful that petitioner's act of grabbing 
the youth for purposes of wresting from 
him the six-pack of beer presented a "real, 
present and apparent threat of bodily 
harm." Rather, it should have been appar-
ent to a reasonable man that petitioner in-
tended no harm under the circumstances 
but acted only to retrieve property which 
he believed to have been stolen. 
Moreover, we also suggested in Mathews 
that the aggressor provision was intended 
as a deterrent to, or punishment for, acts 
of "wilful wrongdoing" or "intentional 
misconduct." {Id., at pp. 728, 734-735, 100 
Cal.Rptr. 301, 493 P.2d 1165.) Petitioner's 
good faith attempt to prevent a theft of his 
employer's property should not reasonably 
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be construed as misconduct disqualifying 
him from compensation benefits. Indeed, 
if the rule were otherwise, an employee 
would forfeit his compensation rights 
whenever he initiated physical means of 
preventing misconduct by others and an al-
tercation developed causing him injury. 
Finally, the record indicates that the 
board did not find that petitioner was an 
aggressor, nor did the board purport to 
deny petitioner compensation benefits on 
that basis. The board's sole theory was 
the petitioner was not acting in the course 
of his employment when he was injured, a 
theory which was incorrect as a matter of 
law, by reason of the emergency doctrine 
discussed above. 
I The decision of the board is annulled 
and the cause is remanded to the board for 
further proceedings consistent with the 
views herein expressed. 
WRIGHT, C. J., and McCOMB, TO-
BRINER, MOSK, SULLIVAN and 
CLARK, JJ., concur. 
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16 Cal.3d 14 
j _ B R E T HARTE INN, INC., Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
Defendant and Appellant 
S. F. 23263. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Feb. 3, 1976. 
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing 
March 10, 1976. 
The City and County of San Francisco 
appealed from a judgment of the Superior 
Court, San Francisco County, Bernard B. 
Glickfeld, J., granting recovery of certain 
personal property taxes paid under protest. 
The Supreme Court, Sullivan, J., held, in-
ter alia, that a valuation method pursuant 
to which full cash value of personal prop-
erty was arrived at by discounting original 
acquisition cost by a uniform "depreciation 
factor" of 50% for all properties, regard-
less of age or condition, was arbitrary, in 
excess of the assessor's discretion, and in 
violation of constitutional and legislative 
requirements that all properties subject to 
taxation be assessed at its full cash value. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <S>707 
Action by taxpayer to recover alleged-
ly improperly imposed personal property 
taxes was not barred by prior proceeding 
in which superior court issued writ of 
mandate directing City and County of San 
Francisco to undertake appropriate steps to 
recover taxes lost due to misconduct of 
former assessor where taxpayer involved 
in major suit was not party to prior pro-
ceeding and interest of all parties to that 
proceeding were adverse to those of tax-
payer. 
2. Taxation <S=543(I) 
If plaintiff in personal property tax 
refund suit claims only that assessor and 
board of equalization erroneously applied 
valid method of determining full cash val-
ue, decision of board is equivalent to deter-
mination of trial court and trial court in 
turn may review only record presented to 
board; trial court may overturn board's 
decision only when no substantial evidence 
supports it, in which case actions of board 
are deemed so arbitrary as to constitute 
deprivation of property without due proc-
ess. 
3. Taxation <S=543(8) 
When taxpayer, seeking refund of per-
sonal property taxes, challenges validity of 
valuation method itself, trial judge is faced 
with question of law as whether challenged 
method of valuation is arbitrary, in excess 
of discretion or in violation of standards 
prescribed by law. 
4. Taxation <^347 
Xo property may escape taxation be-
cause of difficulty in determining its full 
cash value. West's Ann.Const. art. 13, § 1. 
